Project Atlas · Reference architecture

Designing a secure, operable Azure SaaS platform.

A fictional, industry-neutral architecture exercise showing how I turn business requirements and credible threats into design decisions that teams can build and operate.

99.9%Availability target
15 minRecovery point objective
2 hoursRecovery time objective
Zero TrustIdentity-led access

Scenario

What Atlas has to protect

Project Atlas is a fictional multi-tenant SaaS platform used by organisations to manage sensitive documents, workflows and partner integrations. Customers use a public web application; partners integrate through an API; administrators use a separate privileged interface.

The design assumes an Azure PaaS-first delivery model, Entra ID for the workforce, OAuth client credentials for partner integrations, infrastructure as code and GitHub Actions for deployment. No design, hostname, process or control state represents a real employer.

Diagram 01 · Target state

High-level reference architecture

Trust boundaries are deliberate: public traffic terminates at the edge, workloads reach data services privately, and identities—not network location alone—authorise each action.

Architecture decisions

Controls chosen for a reason

ADR-01

Separate the admin plane

The privileged interface uses a distinct hostname, Conditional Access policy and access path. Eligible roles activate through PIM rather than remaining permanently assigned.

Reduces:Session theft, privilege persistence and accidental administration.
ADR-02

Remove public data access

SQL, Blob Storage and Key Vault use private endpoints. Application managed identities replace embedded secrets and shared connection credentials.

Reduces:Internet exposure, credential leakage and uncontrolled data-plane access.
ADR-03

Make delivery a control

Infrastructure changes are peer-reviewed, scanned and deployed through short-lived federated credentials. Production changes require approval and create auditable evidence.

Reduces:Configuration drift, long-lived secrets and unreviewed change.
ADR-04

Design for investigation

Identity, WAF, application, control-plane and data-access telemetry are routed centrally with health monitoring, retention and named response ownership.

Reduces:Detection blind spots and slow, evidence-poor response.

Diagram 02 · Trust boundaries

Management and data paths stay separate.

Resilience & assurance

Secure has to remain available.

Zone-redundant services are used where the service tier supports them. Database point-in-time restore and geo-redundant storage are tested against the 15-minute RPO and two-hour RTO rather than treated as configuration claims.

Release evidence includes policy compliance, external exposure checks, identity-path tests, backup restoration and confirmation that critical telemetry reaches monitoring. Exceptions have owners and expiry dates.

Residual risk register

RiskTreatmentResidual
Compromised customer session

Short sessions, anomaly detection and step-up authentication for sensitive actions.

Medium
Malicious privileged user

PIM, approval, segregation of duties and immutable audit export reduce—but cannot eliminate—insider risk.

Medium
Regional Azure failure

Backups are geo-redundant; full active-active operation is rejected as disproportionate to the stated availability target.

Low

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